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1,N THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BETTILYON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
- vs. STA'11 E ROAD COMMISSION OF

UTAH,

Case No. 10897

Defendant wnd Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for breach of contract
by the defendant, State Road Commission, whereby said
defendant failed to furnish a free and clear right-of-way
before requiring plaintiff to commence construction
thereon.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
BY LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted defendant's Motion to
Di1:m1iss when~in it was alleged a:> the only grounds for
the Motion that,
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint failed to state a claim on

which relief could be granted, and
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(2) The court lacked jurisdiction ov<c>r the Stat~
Road Commission in that the defendant was acting in its
governmental function and had not consented to be sued.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the final Order of thr
Lower Court with instructions to determine its damages
and a Judgment wherein its right to pursue this action
is upheld as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court has previously ruled that in passing on
a Motion to Dismiss, all of the facts alleged and set forth
in the pleading attacked must be assumed to be true.
Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah -1:76, 206 P. 2d 153.
Based on this rule, the facts to be considered are as
follows:
On or about January 22, 1963, Bettilyon Construction
Company entered into a contract with the defendant by
and through its Department of Highways, for the construction of an elevated highway near 6th South Street
in Salt Lake City, which said highway was designed to
serve vehicular traffic leaving Interstate Highway 15
and Interstate Highway 80, Salt Lake County, Utah
known as Project No. I-IG-15-7(3-1:) Second Contract and
Project No. I-15-7 (46) 306 Second Contract.
The burden of furnishing the right-of-way to a con·
tractor who is to build a highway for the State Road
Commission of Utah is entirely and completely the obli·
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gation and burden of defendant in that this contract by
its own terms incorporated Paragraph 1-7.18 of the
Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction of the State of Utah issued by defendant in 1960
of which this Court may take judicial notice under the
provisions of Section 78-25-1 UCA 1953. This paragraph
provides:
"The Director [of Highways J will be responsible
for the securing of all necessary rights-of-way in
advance of construction." (Emphasis added)
Thereafter, on or about February 7, 1963, the
EIMCO Corporation filed a Complaint in the District
Court of Salt Lake County as Civil No. 141252, naming
the plaintiff and the individual commissioners of defendant herein as defendants, wherein it was requested that
plaintiff be restrained from constructing said highway
until such time as the nature and extent of the easement
necessary to construct the aforesaid elevated highway
could be determined and compensation be paid to the
ElMGO Corporation for an alleged taking of its property.
As a result of the commencement of this action, title
to the right-of-way necessary for the construction of said
elevated highway was in dispute.
Thereafter, plaintiff requested that defendant provide counsel or representation on its behalf to defend
the action brought by the EIMCO Corporation.
The defendant, State Road Commission of Utah, at
no time agreed to furnish legal representation for plain-

4
tiff in the aforesaid action, but refused to do so on the
grounds that legal counsel might have a conflict of interest. In fact, a conflict of interest did exist because
defendant further informed plaintiff that it would be
required to complete the aforesaid contraict according to
its terms thereby subjecting itself to possible damages
to the E,IMCO Corporation.
As a result of defendant's refusal to furnish legal
representation to plaintiff and further insistence that
plaintiff go forward with the construction project before
the dispute over the right-of-way had been resolved,
plaintiff was required to obtain counsel to represent it
in determining the issues raised by the EIMCO Corporation in the aforesaid action. In this connection, plaintiff
incurred legal expenses in the amount of $2,144.00.
Plaintiff has demanded payment from the State Road
Commission for its necessary legal expenses incurred in
the aforementioned action, but defendant has refused to
pay the same suggesting that plaintiff should initiate
legal action to enforce its claim. By contract plaintiff is
also entitled to an additional reasonable attorneys' fee
herein in connection with this action to enforce its rights
against defendant's breach of contract.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
BETTILYON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY HAS
STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED.

The parties hereto entered into a contract. The State
Road Commission as a party thereto was required to
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furnish to the plaintiff a right-of-way on which to commence the work before that work could be commenced.
At the time the plaintiff, as contractor, was required to
commence construction, the extent of right-of-way available to it was in dispute. Plaintiff has alleged that the
defendant, State Road Commission, refused to perform
under the contract and that damages have resulted from
this refusal.

It seems clear that a claim upon which relief could
' the defendant enJoys
.
be granted has been stated unless
statutory immunity from suit or unless its requirement
that plaintiff commence work on a disputed right-of-way
as a matter of law did not constitute a breach of its
contract with the plaintiff. These matters will be discussed in the next succeeding Points.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT, STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
HAS NO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN THIS
ACTION.

Section 27-12-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, provides :
"By its name the Commission may sue, and it may
be sued only on written contracts made by it olf"
under its authority." (Emphasis added)
Identical language as contained in Section 36-2-1
Rev. St. 1933 was construed by the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of Campbell Building Company v. State Road
Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857. There a contractor brought an action for damages arising out of
breach of contract. Delay resulting from failure of the
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State to provide a right-of-way was alleged. The defensr~
raised were grounded in governmental immunity and it
was contended that the State of Utah was not liable on
its contracts as would be an individual but was only
responsible in specific performance.
The Court, in a lengthy Opinion discussed the allegations of the State's defense, and in applicable part
stated:

1

"The statutory prov1s10n is twofold. First, it
waives immunity from suit by saying 'the commission * * * may be sued,' and, second, a limitation is imposed by the following language: 'only
on written contracts made by it or under its authority.' " ... 70 P. 2d 861
The Court continued:
"The contract in question is one made by the commission under its authority. It is such a contract
as mav be 'sued on' under the statute. The defendant ~ays that the right to sue the State Road
Commission conferred by the statute 'only embraces suits in specific performance of the written '
contracts it has power to make and for funds
payable under such contracts for road construction ,
only.' The statute, however, places no such restriction on the right to sue, but merely says the
commission may be sued on its written contracts."
... 70 P. 2d 861
The question of the liability of the State for damages for failure to furnish right-of-way was resolved as
follows:
1

"The statutory provision must mean what the
language naturally imports, that any suit on a
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written contract which could be brought by the
contractor against the other contracting party,
if an individual, corporation, or municipality,
might now he rnaintained under this authorization
against the State Road Commission acting for the
state, 29 C.J. 567." ... 70 P. 2d 861
After citing several cases and discussing the principll' of sovereign immunity at length, the Court continued:
"The cases hold, and that is the reasonable view
to take, that where work is delayed by failure to
provide right-of-way or by interference of the
state engineer, causing extra expenses, such are
matters of breach of contract, and whether or not
negligence enters into the matter is of no moment." ... "When the contra.ctor is placed by act
of the state in a position that it beoomes necessary
for him to incitr the burden of extra work to complete the job agreed upon, he is entitled to just
compensation therefor." (Emphasis added) . . .
70 P. 2d 861
'l'here is widespread support for the proposition that,
where a state may be sued on its contracts, an action
may be brought against it for damages for breach of
contract. See 81 C.J.S., States, 125.
The matter seems clearly settled m Utah where
the State Road Commission enjoys no immunity for
breach of its written contracts and an action may be
brought against it for damages arising out of such a
breach.
POINT III
FAILURE TO FURNISH RIGHT-OF-WAY HEREIN
IS A BREACH OF CONTRACT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
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The only other possible ground for granting the
Motion to Dismiss below is that the State Road Commission did not breach its \\Titten contract as a matter of
law. While a state possibly might not be able to breach
on implied contracts, the condition breached here is not
implied, but express. Several courts have dealt with
similar fact situations. The case of Derby Road Building
Compa;ny v. Commonwealth Department of Highways,
Ky., 317 S.W. 2d 891, involved a highway contractor's
action against the State of Kentucky to recover for losses
incurred because of delay in completing a contract project because the utility lines had not been relocated. The . '
standard specifications of the State of Kentucky concerning right-of-way read as follows:
"The right-of-way for the highway will be obtained
by the Department prior to issuing the 'Notice to
Begin Work' ... "
The Court said,
"Even without this express provision of the contract, it may be said that a contract for the construction of a building or highway 'implies as 3Jl
essential condition that a site shall be furnished
upon which a structure may be erected."
Citing 9 Am. J ur., Building and Coristruction Contracts, Section 16 and Guerini Stone Company v. Carlin
Construction Comparny, 248 U.S. 334, 39 Sup. Ct. 102, 63
Law Ed. 275. The Court continued,
"The implied condition or agrPemPnt as a prerequiste to the contractor to performing his part
of the contract is not to be confused with 3Jl
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implied contract, for a breach of which neither
the State nor its agency in executing or performing a governmental function can be held liable in
damages."
Regarding :,;overeign immunity, the Court continued,
"First we note the distinction that this is not an
action in tort, but is an action for the breach of
an express contract made by the State's Department of Highways ... "
The Court then cited the ca:,;e of Watkir1;s v. The
Department of Highways, 290 S. W. 2d 28, for the proposition that the plaintiff could have maintained a suit on
its contract against the Department to enforce certain
rights. Quoting from the latter case, the Court said,
"Surely when the Department of Highways was
authorized to enter into this contract, the Legislature contemplated a binding agreement legally
enforceable by both parties. A mutuality of obligation was created. To deny appellants a right
of action would be to destroy the sanctity of all
contracts made by State Agencies and would
seriously impair the operation of our Government.
It may be said that the Legislature, in authorizing
the Department to enter into a Contract, by necessary implication authorized it to sue or be sued
thereon."
'l1he case of Wunderlich v. State Highway Commission., 183 Miss. 428, 184 So. 456, involved an action by a
contractor against the State Highway Commission of
Mississippi to recover the expenses paid by the contractor
incurred in the construction by him of a highway for
the Commission. Involved in this action were certain
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damages resulting from an alleged failure to furnish
right-of-way. The Court discussed at some length the
obligation of the State regarding damages on its contract with private parties and concluded:
"No public policy there intervenes to excuse the
State from its contract obligations and for the
proximate consequences of its breach thereof; and
so we hope that, in such a case, the State is as a
private contracting party, with the same rules of
liability to be applied; and when, as here, the
State creates an agency for the construction of
buildings or roads or the like, and gives to that
agency the dignity of a corporate body, authorizes
it to make the particular construction contracts
such as here in question; empowers it to supervise
the execution thereon and to pay for the same
out of funds supplied into the hands of said
agency, and finally allows it, in broad and general
terms, to sue and be sued, then that agency must
stand in a suit by the contractor in all matters
respecting the performance of its contract, and
as to breaches of it during the course of such
performance, as if the agency were a private party,
and in accordance with the general contract ..."
A subsequent appeal involving the same facts of
the situation upheld the principle that the State Highway
Commission is liable for a breach of contract to the
principal contractor for the expenses incurred by the
principal contractor as a result of a delay in procuring
a right-of-way. See 10 So. 2d 453, Suggestion of Error
Overruled 194, Miss. 119, 11 So. 2d 437.

A case very similar to the one under consideration
is Madison Cownty Construction Comparny v. State, 31
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N.Y.S. 2d 883. In that case the contractor brought an
action against the State of New York seeking reimbursement for a judgment recovered against the construction
company by landowners for trespass and for the costs
and expenses incurred in defending such action by landowners. The facts disclosed that in 1937 the contractor
entered into a contract with the State of New York for'
the construction of a highway. Later in the same month,
it was notified to start work immediately on construction of the project. Work was begun and continued until
its completion on November 5, 1938. On November 16 of
1938 the highway was accepted by the State. In May of
1938 an action was brought against the contractor to
eject from the lands involved in the construction project
and in 1939 a decision was rendered against the claimant
aw?-rding the plaintiff nominal damages and eosts, holding that the contractor in performance of its work trespassed upon lands which had not been properly acquired
by the State.
The New York Court of Claims held that,
"By failure to give to claimant the site of the
work, the State breached the contract, thereby
causing claimant to be delayed in the performance
thereof and claimant is entitled to compensation
therefor." llfansfield v. Ne1c Yark Central Railroad Company, 102 N.Y. 205, 6 N.E. 686, Sch'Ulflr
nernimk Constniction Company v. State of New
York, 116 Misc. 770, 189 N.Y. Supp. 567, Wright
& Kremer:;, Inc., 1-. State of New York, 263 N.Y.
615, 189 N.E. 724.
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The Court continued,
"Among the damages claimed were those for costs,
legal fees, and disbursements incurred in defending the action in the Supreme Court. Ordinarily,
costs and expenses in a prior action are not recoverable in a separate and subsequent action,
but there are exceptions to such rule."
The Court cited Cooper v. W eissblatt, 154 Misc. 522,
277 N.Y.S. 709, 719 as follows:
"There are also cases where a breach by the defendant of a contract between him and the plaintiff has resulted in a judgment being obtained
against the plaintiff in a prior action. In these
cases the plaintiff has been permitted to recover
of the defendant, in a subsequent action, the
amount of damage awarded against him in the
prior action, and also the legal expenses incurred
by him in defending that action, especially where
the defendant has been requested to come in and
defend. Carleton v. Lombard, 19 App. Div. 297,
46 N.Y.S.120, affirmed 162 N.Y. 628, 57 N.E.1106;
Dubois v. Hennancc, 56 N.Y. G73. The theory
of such cases quoted seems to be that the defendant must be deemed to have contemplated that the
breach of his contract with the plaintiff might
subject the latter to damages in an action by a
third party, and therefore, he is deemed in law
to have impliedly agreed to become responsible
therefor... "
The Court also cited 25 C.J.S., Damages, Section 50
(c), Page 534 as follows:

"Where the natural and proximate consequence of
a wr.ongful act has been to involve plaintiff in litigation with others, there may, as a general rule,
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he u reco,vcry in damages against the author of
such act of the reasonable expenses incurred in
such litigation, together with compensation for
attorney's fees and such costs as may have been
awarded aga,iust plaintiff; but such expenses must
be the natural and proximate consequence of the
injury comvlained of, and must have been incurred
nece~sarily and in good faith, and the amount
thereof must be reasonable."
"Here, the State made a contract with the claimant. Engineers for the State made plans for the
construction of the highway and the State got
the location of the road. Claimant was directed
to proceed with its work on such location and in
the action referred to was compelled to cease
operations. It then had to def end itself in the
absence of a defense on the part of the State so
that the question could be decided as to whether
the loca-tion of the highway was upon public or
priva,te lands. It could not, of course, proceed with
the work until that question had been determined.
In the action, it was held that the location of the
mad, as fixed by the State authorities and upon
which location claimant was working, included
lands which were not owned by the State, but by
private parties. In effect, it means that the State,
in staking out the highway, had led the claimant
to believe that it was working on land acquired
by the State which was not the fact. The leg,al
expenses were not incurred in litigation between
the parties, but in an action between a thirid party
and the claimant, growing out of the unlawful acts
of the State. Under these conditions and from the
authorities cited, I am satisfied that claimant is
entitled to recover f ram the State the damages
oaused by the delay in the work ... " (Emphasis
added)

So in the present case, Bettilyon Construction was
forced by the defendant to defend an action wherein the
question was whether the proposed right-of-"\vay was public or private properly. Plaintiff had no assurance that
the right-of-way was clear. By failing to give plaintiff
a clear work site, the Road Commission breached its contract and caused the plaintiff to incur expenses of defending the suit. Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for
these expenses.

CONC'LUSION
The Judgment of Dismissal of the Lower Court is
not in harmony with the law. It should be reversed with
instructions to determine plaintiff's damages and to
grant judgment therefor in accordance with the law.
Respectfully submitted,

KIRTON & BETTILYON
F. Burton Howard
336 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

